

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Japan's Comprehensive Grand Security Strategy in East Asia

by

COL Tetsuro Yamanoue
Infantry of JGSDF

Mr. Lawrence Michael Blotzer
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Japan's Comprehensive Grand Security Strategy in East Asia Unclassified				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Yamanoue, Tetsuro ; Author				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN		
					Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Col Tetsuro Yamanoue

TITLE: Japan's Comprehensive Grand Security Strategy in East Asia

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 April 2003

PAGES: 28

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Strategic relations in East Asia continue to present a feature of the balance of power, where two divided areas--the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait--remain the focus of international politics as vestiges of the Cold War. Ideas and concepts for regional security mechanisms must be formed to effectively forestall these causes of conflict and to ease tensions. The time has come to synthesize the various attempts made so far in this direction and to take a further step ahead.

Japan achieved its post-World War II recovery and prosperity as a beneficiary of the Japan-US alliance and international system. As a major economic power, Japan has an obligation to assist in the creative development of international order and must play a fitting and constructive role.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the security environment trends and Japan's comprehensive grand security strategy (Japan-U.S. security arrangements, multilateral regional security framework and the basic concept of defense policy) in East Asia.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	III
PREFACE	VII
JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE GRAND SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA.....	1
<u>SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS IN EAST ASIA.....</u>	1
<u>DESTABILIZING FACTORS.....</u>	1
<u>POSITIVE FACTORS</u>	2
<u>MAJOR SECURITY AGENDA IN NORTHEAST ASIA.....</u>	3
<u>THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE</u>	4
<u>THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE</u>	5
<u>JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE GRAND SECURITY STRATEGY.....</u>	6
<u>SUSTAINING THE CREDIBLE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGMENTS.....</u>	6
<u>CREATING MULTILATERAL REGIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK</u>	8
<u>THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE POLICY.....</u>	10
<u>EXPECTED ACTIVATION OF DEFENSE POLICY DEBATE.....</u>	11
<u>THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE</u>	12
<u>THE USE OF WEAPONS</u>	13
<u>CONCLUSION.....</u>	14
ENDNOTES.....	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

PREFACE

Strategic relations in East Asia continue to present a feature of the balance of power, where two divided areas--the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait--remain the focus of international politics as vestiges of the Cold War. Efforts to introduce regional security mechanisms have been extremely difficult under the circumstances in which China, where economic development has brought the wake of a variety of domestic concerns; the Taiwan Strait, where the military option has not yet been renounced; North Korea, which considers the development of its armed forces as high priority in spite of the economic crisis; and Indonesia, where political crisis puts the country at risk of disintegration. Ideas and concepts for regional security mechanisms must be formed to effectively forestall these causes of conflict and to ease tensions. The time has come to synthesize the various attempts made so far in this direction and to take a further step ahead.

The threats and risks in East Asia are not limited to inter-state relations within the traditional balance of power. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 represented the symbolic fact that the threat posed by the non-state entities has become one of the top-priority issues for international security. New approaches to regional security cooperation are required for issues that cannot be adequately addressed within traditional frameworks, including the stability of state governance, the safety of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), energy issues, and international organized crime.

More than a decade since the end of the Cold War, the security mechanism in East Asia has been in major transition. The U.S.-led bilateral alliance networks, especially the Japan-U.S. alliance, have evolved their concept, roles and missions from threat-driven alignment to a framework emphasizing the enhancement of the regional stability. Cooperative security, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) as a major framework, served almost a decade to build confidence among nations through continued dialogue among the member-states, and is now seeking for the next stage to introduce measures for preventive diplomacy.

There are also emerging features of security cooperation in East Asia that are not necessary based on its geographical groupings but on its security concerns and capability, which leads to the formation of a coalition of the willing. These multi-dimensional developments indicate that security cooperation in East Asia is far more complex today than the traditional bilateral-multinational relationships model, and is on the verge of new developments.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the security environment trends and Japan's comprehensive grand security strategy (Japan-U.S. security arrangements, multilateral regional security framework and the basic concept of defense policy) in East Asia.

JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE GRAND SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS IN EAST ASIA

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) announced by the U.S. Department of Defense in October 2001 regards Asia as a region gradually becoming susceptible to large-scale military competition. It refers to the region from the Middle East to Northeast Asia as an “arc of instability,” and expresses concern about the possible emergence of a “military competitor with a formidable resource base” in the region.

Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by radical or extremist internal political forces or movements. Many of these states field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.¹

The Asia region is now relatively peaceful, although there is a broad consensus that the potential for uncertainty and instability is significant. There are two aspects to the region's dynamism in the post-Cold War period.

DESTABILIZING FACTORS

The first is the dynamism of challenge, which means destabilizing factors. The challenges to peace and stability in the region consist of two types. One is inherent sub-regional problem such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the China-Taiwan relationship, the East Timor and Indonesia's domestic situation in Northeast Asia, the South China Sea issue in Southeast Asia, and the Kashmir conflict in Southwest Asia. Another type of challenge to peace and stability comes from common regional issues of a transnational nature. These include nationalism, the imbalance in military modernization programs, international organized crime, terrorism, ethnic conflict, narcotics trafficking, territorial issues among nations, the National Missile Defense(NMD)- Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) issue, the proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) (especially the development and transfer of nuclear weapons and missiles), the international movement of labor and refugees, instability in areas adjacent to SLOC and piracy incidents, and the widening of the economic gap between post-modern,

modern, and pre-modern states. An energy and food crisis due to increased population and economic growth is a potentially destabilizing factor in the future.

The regional framework and organization for security cooperation has not been well developed due to the diversity of the security environment, national interests, and the policies of individual nations in Asia. However, since the end of the Cold War, Asia has faced the potential for instability in not only economics but also in security. Most nations in the region share common concerns about the potential for instability and uncertainty, and seek to manage and minimize them through dialogues and cooperation in the region. The ARF was established in 1994 in order to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.² Multilateral security dialogues and cooperation for this purpose, such as the ARF, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)+3(Japan, China and the Republic of Korea) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), have been developing significantly in recent years. Unfortunately, their momentum has stalled to some extent due to the economic crisis in 1997 and the nationalistic approach of some participants.³

POSITIVE FACTORS

The other aspect of dynamism in the region includes the positive factors of opportunity and expectation, of which there are three elements. The first element is the presence and commitment of the United States. The Japan-U.S. alliance is unquestionably critical for the peace and stability not only of Japan, but also of the entire Asia-Pacific region.⁴ Japan and the U.S. have made significant efforts to maintain their alliance in the post-Cold War period, putting priority on exploring and promoting common national values and interests. During the Cold War period, the Japan-U.S. alliance contributed to deterring Soviet military intervention in Asia and to preventing the transfer of Soviet forces from the Far East Asia to the European front. While continuing to do this, the alliance has expanded its role to managing destabilizing factors in the Far East, including military confrontation and confusion on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and other incidents. Both Japan and the United States have made serious efforts to strengthen their bilateral security ties in the areas of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, the effective use of U.S. bases in Japan, and the BMD joint research program. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the most significant factor for peace and stability in the region as a whole.

The second element of opportunity is the multilateral cooperation and exchanges among the nations in the region. This was manifested in the dialogues and the cooperative approach

that led to the steady strengthening of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in matters of economic development and cooperation and of the ARF on political and security issues. In July 2000, the ARF held the seventh ministerial conference since its establishment in 1994, and there has been remarkable progress in dialogues and cooperation on regional security in the past several years. Two major factors lie behind these developments in the security dialogue in Asia. The first is the region's economic development and growth, which has infused its countries with confidence and sparked moves to seek a collective identity for Asia as a whole. The second is the growing recognition of the many potential elements of instability that exist there and of the need to build a framework for dialogue within the region to prevent escalation of disputes into conflicts. An indication of this recognition was given at the second ARF conference, where agreement was reached on a three-step approach to the pursuit of regional stability through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy, and approaches to conflict resolution.⁵ Since then, multilateral security dialogues and cooperation have concentrated on CBMs. A new focus is now expected to be conflict prevention, or preventive diplomacy. CBMs and preventive diplomacy in this region both exhibit some typically Asian characteristics, including a realistic and gradual approach toward consensus. Therefore, development is slow and it is still difficult to reach agreements that include binding obligations. However, regional security cooperation through CBMs and preventive diplomacy has played a significant role in promoting mutual understanding and confidence among nations in the region. These measures contribute to peace and stability in order to complement, not to offset, the roles of the alliances.

Third, the improvement in the bilateral relationships among the four major powers in the region- the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan - is also a significant and positive indication. In the post-Cold War period, the relationship among the major powers has been characterized, in general, as a "cooperation of military power," in contrast to the balance-of-power nature during the Cold War.⁶ However, relations among the major powers still exhibit some elements of power sharing and a nationalistic approach, as most major actors put a higher priority on national interests than before. In any case, China's future and the relationship among the four major powers are still key factors in shaping the regional security structure and in securing peace and stability.

MAJOR SECURITY AGENDA IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Northeast Asia is the only region in which the complexly interrelated interests of all four major powers overlap. On the other hand, each of the bilateral relationships between major

powers has a different aspect and dimension. So far, the Korean Peninsula issue and the security in the Taiwan Strait are the most serious and common sub-regional concerns that involve the national interests and security of major actors.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUE

The North-South dialogue and relationship in the Korean Peninsula are encouraging. The U.S., the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan have closely coordinated their policies of deterrence and dialogue in order to persuade North Korea to open up to international society. The Japanese Prime Minister and North Korean leader held a historic meeting in September 17, 2002. However, the situation in the Korean Peninsula continues to be one of the most acute security problems in the region.

There are three challenges and potential risks concerning North Korea.

First is the nature of the North Korean leadership, which is perceived as a military-oriented dictatorship. It should be noted that North Korea, in the past, appeared to take a brinkmanship approach, trying to seize some collateral by intentionally arousing tension.⁷ North Korea launched ballistic missiles over Japanese territory in 1998 and sent undercover intelligence ships into Japanese territorial waters in 1999 and 2001. Japan has clear evidence that North Korea is responsible for the abduction of Japanese citizens and is also involved in drug trafficking to Japan. The reasons for these hostile actions are not known with certainty but it is speculated that they were intended to frighten other nations into agreeing to North Korea's terms.

The second challenge North Korea poses for Japan is its nuclear development program. The background and intent of North Korea's nuclear development program is not clear. The program had been frozen by the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. However, North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a major international agreement with the goal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology.⁸ There is serious concern that if North Korea successfully produces nuclear weapons and mounts them on medium and long-range ballistic missiles, the security environment in Asia will absolutely change.

The third challenge is North Korea's missile-development program. While its nuclear weapons program had been frozen for the time being in accordance with the U.S.-North Korea agreement, the progress that North Korea has achieved in missile development is more worrisome, as it is thought to be tied to the country's nuclear weapons program. North Korea has a history of selling ballistic missiles and missile-related technology to countries in the Middle

East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia for hard currency. The No-Dong and Taepo-Dong ballistic missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. North Korea already possesses an adequate arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and the possibility that these missile could, in the future, be tipped with nuclear warheads is a serious threat. It is clear that North Korean missiles are able to strike anywhere in Japanese territory. While the U.S. is concerned with the proliferation and development of the Taepo-Dong missiles, Japan is concerned about the deployment of the No-Dong missiles. So far, an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea has put a moratorium on North Korea's launching of ballistic missiles. However, North Korea has to develop these missiles to earn foreign exchange from their sale. In any event, the development of ballistic missiles by North Korea could decisively upset the military balance in Northeast Asia, and the combination of North Korea's missile development and nuclear weapons programs has very serious implications for the security of Northeast Asia.

THE TAIWAN STRAIT ISSUE

In recent years China has strengthened economic relations and human exchanges with Taiwan through the promotion of trade and investment, and exchanges in areas such as culture and science. At the same time, China holds on to the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore an internal matter. Also, despite continuously reiterating its aim of unification by peaceful means, China has often declared that it has not ruled out the use of force against any intervention by foreign powers on China's unification issue, or against any attempt to win independence for Taiwan. The security of the Taiwan Strait relies on the movement and direction of politics in China.

According to the QDR, maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral - from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan - represents a particularly challenging area.⁹ The military competitor in this region is obviously China.

Despite the impact of the global economic slowdown and terrorism in the United States, the Chinese economy has been progressing extremely favorably. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that growth rate in China would be about 7 percent in 2002 and 7.4 percent in 2003.¹⁰ Furthermore, China has acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and is moving ahead with globalization of its economy. China strongly opposes the construction of a unipolar world, which the United States has been promoting, and has been strengthening relations with Russia and Central Asia countries in order to contrast a multipolar world. The establishment in June 2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and signing of the

China-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation in July represent such efforts.

In terms of the military, the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been steadily progressing, and a strengthening of the armed forces has been implemented with a focus on science and technology. The Pentagon said that this modernization has been spurred by a potential conflict in the 100-mile (160-km) wide Taiwan Strait.¹¹ Furthermore, offensive capabilities against Taiwan have been improved through carrying out large-scale exercises.

Such rising influence can be interpreted as either offensive or defensive.

So far, no serious tension has been arisen since the presidential election in March 2000. It is expected that U.S. engagement policy encourages China to take a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. However, the possibility of tension turning into conflict between Taiwan and Mainland China cannot be excluded.

JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE GRAND SECURITY STRATEGY

Japan achieved its post-war recovery and prosperity as a beneficiary, security-wise, of the umbrella of the Japan-U.S. alliance and, economy-wise, of the free, multilateral, and non-discriminatory General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-IMF regime.¹²

The relatively stable international order has given Japan a favorable environment, and Japan's security strategy has been to avoid disturbing this order. Japan has tended to follow the U.S. or entrust decisions to the U.S., especially with regard to foreign policy and defense matters. As a defeated nation shortly after the World War II, Japan perhaps had little choice but to adopt this course of action.

However, this passive stance has made defense and security debates overly legalistic and seemingly directed at determining how best to tie the hands of the Japanese government.¹³

Numerous changes, including the end of the Cold War, point to an urgent need for a fundamental review of the post-World War II international order, and it would not do for Japan to remain an introverted bystander during the reconstruction of this international order. As a major economic power, Japan has an obligation to assist in the creative development of the international order and must play a fitting and constructive role.

SUSTAINING THE CREDIBLE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGMENTS

If an enemy has alliances, the problem is grave and the enemy position is strong;
if it has no alliances the problem are minor and the enemy's position weak.

This quotation of "Sun Tzu, The Art of War," illustrates the importance of strong alliances working together for regional security and raising the level of awareness toward threats to that security. Perceived economic, political or military weakness is potential vulnerability in regionally unstable areas of the world.

Japan-U.S. political relations, that have been adrift since the collapse of Soviet Union, now seem to be back on the right track.¹⁵ It would be absurd to treat the relations between the major countries in the international economy as if they were at "economic war." Words matter. Political and intellectual leaders of both nations should make every effort to avoid using self-serving and dangerous metaphors to describe Japan-U.S. relations. This is important not only because their objective should be an "exchange of interests" in economic relations but also, and more fundamentally, because the task of building a new structure for peace and prosperity both at regional and global levels requires closer collaboration between Japan and the U.S.¹⁶ This is the essence of the "alliance" between Japan and U.S. in the future.

Alliance undoubtedly implies military collaboration in time of crisis. By confirming the continued importance of the alliance in the post-Cold War era, we have to openly acknowledge the need to prepare for contingencies in which some use or show of military force is necessary, either for defense or for deterrence.¹⁷

For a long time, Japan has shrugged its shoulders as far as its own security role was concerned. However, that "standoffish" attitude is apparently changing. In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, the Government of Japan (GOJ), under the basic direction of taking a responsible approach with the recognition that the fight against terrorism is related to Japan's own security, decided to strongly support its ally the U.S. and stand firmly together with nations concerned including the U.S.¹⁸ GOJ took dramatic steps to allow for the use of its defense forces far from Japanese shores in a noncombat, combat-support role side-by-side with the U.S. and the allies.

The Japan-U.S. alliance is the very cornerstone to building the future regional and global order. An alliance can be broadly defined as a community of interests, if the nature or qualities and, in that sense, its purpose is broader than merely potential military cooperation in time of war. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the symbol of unity of purpose and cooperation among like-minded nations in their joint efforts to create a new world order.¹⁹

Needless to say, the Japan-U.S. security arrangement has made a great contribution to peace, stability, and prosperity, both regionally and throughout the world. Japan has few natural

resources. In order to keep up its present prosperity, it is essential for Japan not only to continue technological innovation and maintain a free trade system, but also to maintain international markets and secure sea and air lines of communications for free access to vital resources and trade. In other words, Japan's peace, stability, and prosperity are closely related to those of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the world. However, there are many destabilizing factors that require deterrence. Many situations threaten the present status quo. We also know that multinational security arrangements are not perfect. Of course, Japan will cooperate as much as possible to maintain regional stability, to prevent the outbreak of a crisis, and to solve a crisis when it occurs, but it is difficult for Japan to take the lead in these activities because of its history and domestic constraints. Therefore, Japan justly expects the U.S. to play the role of an "anchor of stability," because it not only advocates freedom, democracy, a free trade system, interdependent economic relations and many values in common with Japan, but also because it is the only nation in the world that has the capability to deploy and employ comprehensive force.

The Japan-U.S. security arrangement has contributed to the "Maintenance of Japan's Security," "Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Regions Surrounding Japan," and "Creation of a More Stable Security Environment."²⁰ Japan and the U.S. are working together steadily to achieve these three goals in cooperation with like-minded countries in the region and the world. It is generally acknowledge that Japanese and American ideas are compatible with the strengthening of regional and global security arrangements. A firm alliance between the two must be preserved by all means as a critical asset. One may say that an alliance is by definition an exclusive club whose benefits can not be spread to outsiders. The circle can be broadened, however, to include other like-minded partners in informal ways while keeping the exclusive structure of the alliance intact.

CREATING MULTILATERAL REGIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The greatest source of instability in Northeast Asia is the unpredictable behavior of North Korea. The 1994 "Agreed Framework"²¹ that combined the freezing of North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is still being put to a severe test, and its future is unpredictable. Neither military action by North Korea nor some form of preventive strike by the U.S. is beyond the realm of possibility. Economic or even political collapse of North Korea is also conceivable. While studying scenarios to develop contingency plans for such emergencies, we should explore all available possibilities of avoiding the outbreak of such circumstances, and of helping

the Korean peninsula ultimately achieve a "soft landing" through a peaceful reunification of the ROK and North Korea.

Multilateral frameworks in dealing with North Korea can be categorized into those such as the Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) that exclude North Korea, and those such as the ARF, the KEDO, and the Four-Party Talks (the ROK, North Korea, plus the U.S. and China). The former are the frameworks of "deterrence" which aim at preventing North Korea from taking provocative military actions, while the latter are the frameworks of "cooperation" through engagement, urging North Korea to take responsible behavior as a member of the international community.

However, these multilateral frameworks have not functioned as expected.

Therefore, I recommend that the Six-Party Forum for dialogue consisting of the ROK, North Korea, Japan, the U.S., China, and Russia be established. This would be separate from the existing Four-Party Talks as a forum for discussing not only a framework for peace on the Korean Peninsula but all problems confronting Northeast Asia as well. In light of North Korea's opposition, admitting Japan and Russia to the present Four-Party Talks appears to be not feasible for the time being. On the other hand, should North Korea wish not to participate in the Six-Party Forum, discussions can be begun as Five-Party Talks among Japan, the U.S., China, Russia, and the ROK, leaving the door open to North Korean participation at a later date. In order to enhance the stability of Northeast Asia, the Cold War rivalry between China, Russia, and North Korea on the one side and Japan, the U.S., and the ROK on the other must be overcome and remnants of their Cold War rivalry must be replaced by enhanced mutual understanding and confidence. This could best be achieved first by improving mutual understanding among the four major powers (Japan, the U.S., China, and Russia) and second by further stabilizing the relations among these four powers.

Based on a rather longer-term perspective, as economic interdependence grows more and more, the tendency to resolve disputes by force becomes smaller. In that sense, it is vital that economic cooperation and collaboration among regional states is promoted for the sake of stability in Northeast Asia. Looking globally, Northeast Asia ranks with the Middle East as one of the areas in which the construction of a regional economic cooperation system lags furthest behind. The Middle East is burdened with a fundamental impediment in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, Northeast Asia has no corresponding basic and insurmountable obstacle.

Japan should continue to urge North Korea to open up to the outside world and should continue to work with Russia to lay the groundwork for greater economic interdependence. In addition, the regional scope of Northeast Asia should be expanded to incorporate the northern

Pacific, so that a "North Pacific Cooperation Organization (NPCO)" might be established. This would include Canada and Mongolia together with Japan, the U.S., China, Russia, the ROK and North Korea.

Other countries may be able to learn from Canada's experience and know-how in the economic management of its frigid territories. Mongolia should also be welcomed into such regional economy.

The main challenge of the NPCO is to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity. This is not an easy challenge. There are levels of development, cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome. Habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some countries. To successfully preserve and enhance the peace and prosperity of the region, NPCO must dispassionately analyze the key challenges facing the region. And NPCO should recognize and accept the different approaches to sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity. Thus, a gradual evolutionary approach is required. This evolution can take place in three stages:

- Stage I: Enhance economic development especially in the poorer regions
- Stage II: Promotion of CBMs
- Stage III: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms

THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE POLICY

During the post-World War II and Cold War eras, Japan's national security has been defined narrowly, as only the right to cope with a direct invasion under the condition of "the right of individual-defense" based upon the current interpretation of Constitution. This has prevented a pragmatic and effective approach to cope with other dangerous situations confronting Japan. In the present, uncertain post-Cold War environment, if Japan still maintains such a concept, it will be left out of the creation of a new world order. Thus, it is crucial for Japan to remove the political constraints that have become obstacles for planning a new security strategy. Japan must create a new framework and policy to include "the right of collective self-defense". The arguments regarding the lifting of the ban on collective self-defense can be grouped into two approaches. These approaches are: changing the interpretation of the Constitution, and amending the Constitution so as to lift the prohibition of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Recently, public interest in a constitutional amendment has risen, however, we cannot expect an immediate revision. Thus, the first step is to change the interpretation of the Constitution.

Consequently, this new national security strategy will require new guidance to formulate a complementary national military strategy for the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF).

For several decades after the establishment of the JSDF, Japan's defense strategy was solely focused on deterrent measures against the Soviet Union. However, now Japan should employ a "Flexible Defense Strategy" to cope with the uncertain strategic environment, which might include Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Traditionally, Japan has centered its defense strategy around only a wartime scenario.

As for the ground portion of a new defense doctrine which would follow the national security strategy, the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) must create a new concept to cope with a new age. Until now, it has developed a doctrine that might be referred to as "the threat from the North strategy." To implement this doctrine, the JGSDF developed "the defense at the water's edge with concentrated firepower," and "standardized functional and regional organization" concepts.²² These concepts were created based on Japan's strategic appreciation of the Cold War environment. Through it, the JGSDF was able to contribute to U.S. global strategy as a member of the Western Alliance in partnership with the U.S. Indeed, those concepts also had the significant benefit of requiring a modern force structure for ground power, and the requirement to maintain high levels of readiness and training.

However, after the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, those concepts lost their sense of urgency and were not acceptable in a new era of more peaceful relations. To replace the "threat posed by the Soviet Union" with "the threat by Russia" is difficult to explain to the nation. Also, it is very difficult to cope with two different fronts, the Northern (Russia) and Western (Korean Peninsula/Taiwan Strait) at the same time because of recent national budget problems and their impact upon the defense budget. Therefore, for the time being, the JGSDF should emphasize the front on Western Japan. This may require major changes in the JGSDF's doctrine. However, it is time for that if it is to cope realistically with new geopolitical conditions.

EXPECTED ACTIVATION OF DEFENSE POLICY DEBATE

The Japanese Diet convened an extraordinary session September 27, 2001, following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11. This session, from its nature, can be called the antiterrorism Diet session. In this sitting, the Diet enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was significant in the sense that it demonstrated Japan's willingness to voluntarily and proactively takes part in international cooperation as a member of the international community.

Vigorous debate took place in the Diet deliberations on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, since the legislation envisaged the dispatch of JSDF troops overseas to support the military operations of the United States and other countries.

The Diet debate on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law focused on the “right of collective self-defense” and the “use of weapons.”

It seems important to base future debate of the issue on the following viewpoints, as stated by Prime Minister Koizumi at April 23, 2001 news conference:

What is most important to Japan's national interest at present? Let's consider how to maintain the Japan-U.S. friendship and manage the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty efficiently and functionally. Of course, Japan's use of force is not permissible in foreign territories, foreign territorial waters or foreign airspace. If the U.S. forces came under attack during their joint exercises or operations with the JSDF in waters close to Japan, however, the sense would not be foreign territories, foreign air space or foreign territorial waters. Would Japan be allowed to refrain from doing something even if the U.S. forces came under attack in that case? I respect the government's present interpretation of Constitution, although I think that we must try to consider every possible case. I do not call for changing the interpretation of the Constitution immediately. But I believe we have room to study the issue. What I am saying is that we have room to prudently consider the issue.²³

If Japan is to contribute to stability and security of the East Asia in the future, Japan need to clarify its attitude on whether is able to “exercise its right of collective self-defense” and “use of weapon” and, as consequence, to expand its support to the U.S. in times of emergency.

THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

On May 29, 1981, in the government's written reply to an inquiry by Seiichi Inada, a member of the House of Representatives, they indicated the following interpretation.

Under international law, it is understood that a state has the right of collective self-defense, that is, the right to use force to stop an Armed Attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.²⁴

The interpretation means that Japan has the right of individual self-defense and the right of collective self-defense as the inherent right of sovereign states under international law, but can only exercise the right of individual self-defense under constitutional restraint.

The current position of the government is that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense even in terms of its support for the current U.S. campaign. As a U.S. ally and a member of the international community, Japan's cooperation with the U.S. in military operations is thus under a constraint that prevents it from exercising the right of collective self-defense or resorting to the use of force.

Prime Minister Koizumi made reference to this point during discussion on the Constitution and the bill, saying, "there is a gap between Article 9 of the Constitution and the bill" and signified that "the gap" should be filled with "common sense."²⁵

The constitution is becoming increasingly "irrelevant" in terms of security debate.

THE USE OF WEAPONS

Another controversial issue at the Diet was the use of weapons. SDF members dispatched overseas for the United Nations (UN) Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) had been allowed to use weapons only for minimum self-defense purposes. This was due to the issues of the use of force and the integration with the use of force. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law provides:

Members of the JSDF in charge of cooperation and support activities, search and rescue activities or assistance to affected people, may proportionately use weapons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves, other members of the JSDF who are with them on the scene or those who are with them on the scene and have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under self-defense or act of necessity.

The use of weapons, when a senior officer is present at the scene, shall be conducted only under the order of senior officer, except for cases where offense or danger to lives and bodies are too imminent to wait for such an order. A senior officer present on the scene must give necessary orders with a view to preventing danger to the lives and bodies and also to preventing disorder by the uncontrolled use of weapons, and to ensuring that the use of weapons is done in an appropriate manner.²⁶

The provision has allowed JSDF members to use weapons to protect affected and other people in certain situations. Some lawmakers argued that the antiterrorism bill that included the provision was expanding the scope for the use of weapons as provided in the Law Concerning Cooperation for UNPKO and Other Operations.²⁷ However, the use of weapons under the antiterrorism bill was not as controversial as the use of weapons and the use of force regarding the Law Concerning Cooperation for UNPKO and Other Operations. Other lawmakers argued that the concept of the inherent right of self-defense was difficult to flexibly interpret. They claimed that, from the humanitarian viewpoint, it should be reconsidered with a view to the protection of refugees and others.²⁸ The use of weapons should be considered more flexibly to allow JSDF members to achieve their purposes and to smoothly and safely conduct their duties.

CONCLUSION

After its defeat in the World War II, Japan renounced the path to military power. Instead, it was able to regain and extend its strength during the second half of the 20th century under the international system and the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. In the process, Japan secured for itself a solid position among the advanced industrialized democracies of the world. Likewise, it succeeded in achieving a level of prosperity never before marked in its history.

On September 11, 2001 in the opening year of the new 21st century, a series of terrorist attacks in the U.S. gave a shock throughout the world. Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom stated that "September 11 marked a turning point in history, and that we are now living in a world that was different from even before."²⁹

For Japan to continue to enjoy peace and prosperity in this new era, the global international systems which underpins such peace and prosperity needs to be maintained and strengthened, while East Asia region in which Japan is located must be a stable and energetic area conducive to the same.

As a mature and advanced industrialized democracy, Japan must play an even more active role in the building of the future regional and global order. While Japan is currently engaged in efforts to revitalize its economy, this does not detract from the fact that it ranks as a major economic power. Thus, standing among the leaders of the global society, Japan must seek to play an appropriate role in the resolution of the numerous global issues which beset East Asia. Needless to say, in pursuit of this role, Japan must take advantage of not only economic instruments, but also other means including military power, diplomacy, intelligence and law enforcement/judicial actions.

Japan has the ability to fulfill the ultimate goal of any nation as enunciated by Sun Tzu
"Victory without fighting."³⁰

WORD COUNT = 6,001

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 3-4.
- ² Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "The Objectives of ARF," 2002; available from <<http://www.aseansec.org/3530.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2002.
- ³ Takashi Siraishi, "Fukugo Mondai," Gaiko Forum, no.167 (June 2002): 78.
- ⁴ Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002), 95-96.
- ⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "ARF," 25 July 2001; available from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2002.
- ⁶ Hiroomi Kurisu, Anzen Hosho Gairon (Tokyo: BBA, 1997), 224.
- ⁷ Japan Defense Agency, 42.
- ⁸ "North Korea Pulls Out of Anti-Nuke Agreement, Despite 'Sunshine'," 10 Jan 2003; available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2003/fri/news/01/10/korea/sndex.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003.
- ⁹ Department of Defense, 4.
- ¹⁰ "IMF: China's Growth Rate to Reach 7 Percent in 2002," 19 Apr 2002; available from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/19/eng20020419_94353.shtml>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2002.
- ¹¹ "Pentagon Warns of China Threat," 17 July, 2002; available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/13/china.taiwan/>>; Internet; accessed 7 December 2002.
- ¹² Hiroaki Yokoyama, Higasi-Ajia wa Hitotuninareruka (Tokyo: Doubunkan, 2001), 16.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 18.
- ¹⁴ Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 78.
- ¹⁵ Akio Watanabe, "Changing Context of U.S.-Japan Relations," Conference Paper, Japan Society, Anniversary Roundtables, New York, 16-18 November 1997 and Tokyo, 6-8 April 1997, 1.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ¹⁸ Japan Defense Agency, 108.

¹⁹ Watanabe, 5.

²⁰ Japan Defense Agency, 95-96.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2002," 14 September 2003; available from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 December 2002.

²² Nobuhiko Sato, "Wagakuni no Anzenhosho to Boueisenryaku no Arikata," Rikusen Kenkyu 48, no. 557 (2000): 37-40.

²³ Okazaki Institute, "Syuyoushi no Koizumi Shusyo Hatu no Kisyakaiken Kiji no Bunseki," 29 April 2001; available from <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/ogawa-library/anaonjun.akir42801.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2002.

²⁴ Japan Defense Agency, 346.

²⁵ "Preventive Diplomacy Glue for National Security," 4 December 2001; available from <<http://www.asahi.com/column/funabashi/eng/K2001120400334.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2002.

²⁶ Japan Defense Agency, 115.

²⁷ Hideshi Tokuchi, "On the Defense Policy of Japan after the Cold War," Journal of International Security, no. 29-3 (December 2001): 76.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2002 (Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 14 February 2002), 5-6.

³⁰ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "The Objectives of ARF." 2002. Available from <<http://www.aseansec.org/3530.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 7 December 2002.
- Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- "IMF: China's Growth Rate to Reach 7 Percent in 2002." 19 Apr 2002. Available from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/19/eng20020419_94353.shtml>. Internet. Accessed 21 December 2002.
- Japan Defense Agency. Defense of Japan 2002. Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002.
- Kurusu, Hiroomi. Anzen Hosho Gairon. Tokyo: BBA, 1997.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "ARF." 25 July 2001. Available from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/index.html>>. Internet. Accessed 7 December 2002.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Diplomatic Bluebook 2002." 14 September 2003. Available from <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/index.html>>. Internet. Accessed 8 December 2002.
- "North Korea Pulls Out of Anti-Nuke Agreement, Despite 'Sunshine'." 10 Jan 2003. Available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2003/fri/news/01/10/korea/sndex.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 10 January 2003.
- National Institute for Defense Studies Japan. East Asian Strategic Review 2002. Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 14 February 2002.
- Okazaki Institute. "Syuyoushi no Koizumi Shusyo Hatu no Kisyakaiken Kiji no Bunseki." 29 April 2001. Available from <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/ogawa-library/anaonjun.akir42801.html>>. Internet. Accessed 14 December 2002.
- "Preventive Diplomacy Glue for National Security." 4 December 2001. Available from <<http://www.asahi.com/column/funabashi/eng/K2001120400334.html>>. Internet. Accessed 14 December 2002.
- "Pentagon Warns of China Threat." 17 July 2002. Available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/13/china.taiwan/>>. Internet. Accessed 7 December 2002.
- Sato, Nobuhiko. "Wagakuni no Anzenhosho to Boueisenryaku no Arikata." Rikusen Kenkyu 48, no. 557 (2000): 37-40.
- Siraishi, Takashi. "Fukugo Mondai." Gaiko Forum, no.167 (June 2002): 78.
- Tokuchi, Hideshi. "On the Defense Policy of Japan after the Cold War." Journal of International Security, no. 29-3 (December 2001): 76.

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001.

Watanabe, Akio. "Changing Context of U.S.-Japan Relations." Conference Paper. Japan Society. Anniversary Roundtables: New York, 16-18 November 1997 and Tokyo, 6-8 April 1997.

Yokoyama, Hiroaki. Higasi-Ajia wa Hitotuninareruka. Tokyo: Doubunkan, 2001.